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The UAW and CAW Confront 
Lean Production at Saturn, CAMI, and 
the Japanese Automobile Transplants 
Ernest J. Yanarella and William C. Green 
The North American auto marketplace witnessed a major restructuring 
during the 1980s. This article examines UA W's and CAW's quite different 
and distinctive responses to these developments at two union plants: the 
UA W's and GM's joint operation of the Saturn plant and the CAW's 
adversarial shop floor labor-management relations at CAMI, a GM-Suzuki 
joint venture. Then the article focuses on the common challenges both 
unions have to overcome in organizing Hyundai, the South Korean 
automaker, and the six Japanese plants. The article closes by exploring 
the risks and opportunities both unions face from the North American 
Free Trade Agreement. 
During the decade of the eighties, ten East Asian automobile assembly 
plants were built across the industrial heartland of North America from 
Smyrna, Tennessee to Bromont, Quebec. 1 This experience, rooted in the 
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1. Andrew Mair, Richard Florida, and Martin Kenney, "The New Geography of Au-
tomobile Production: Japanese Transplants in North America,'' Economic Geography, 64 
(October 1988), 352-373. 
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restructuring of the global political economy and the internationalization of 
automobile production, brought into sharp focus the crisis of the Fordist 
regime of industrial production and capital accumulation.2 This crisis, which 
has radiated through the United States and Canadian auto industries and 
through the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the Canadian Auto Workers 
(CAW) unions, has exposed the limitations of the mass production system 
pioneered by Henry Ford and has threatened the stability of the post-World 
War II system of labor-management relations. 
The impact of these developments has been a source of mounting and 
heated scholarly debate. U.S. and Canadian scholars have observed two 
distinctive political strategies employed by the UA W and CAW in response 
to the negative consequences of these developments for organized labor in 
the U.S. and Canadian auto production and auto supplier industries.3 Some 
have extolled the virtues of an incipient "post-Fordist" regime4 synthesizing 
mass and craft production into lean management and assembly line tech-
niques.5 Others, while acknowledging new tendencies manifested in Japa-
nese production techniques, have developed a theory of neo-Fordism6 that 
2. Fordism is a method of mass production characterized by a division of the assembly 
line into ever more specific and defined tasks and a division of labor "which was inflexible, 
hierarchical, and characterized by increasing automation, routinization, and mechanization of 
production tasks." John Holmes, "Industrial Restructuring in a Period of Crisis: An Analysis 
of the Canadian Automobile Industry, 1973-1983," Antipode. 20 (1988), 19-51. 
3. Gregory Albo, "The 'New Realism' and Canadian Workers," Canadian Politics, ed. 
A. Gagner and J. Breckerton (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadmire, 1990), 47-53; and Jonathan 
Morris, "A Japanization of Canadian Industry?" The New Era of Global Competition, ed. by 
Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 206-
228. 
4. Post-Fordism or lean production is a flexible production system characterized by the 
integration and rationalization of assembly and auto parts production and the reliance on the 
team concept to provide so-called multiskilled training, job rotation, continuous work im-
provement, and reduced product defects. For a discussion of post-Fordism, see the references 
in footnote 5. 
5. Haruo Shimada and John Paul McDuffie. "Industrial Relations and 'Humanware': 
Japanese Investments in Automobile Manufacturing in the United States." {IMVP briefing 
paper] (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Motor Vehicle Program, 
May 4, 1987); Martin Kenney and Richard Florida. "Beyond Mass Production: Production and 
the Labor Process in Japan," Politics and Society, 16 (March 1988), 121-158; James Womack, 
Daniel Jones, and Daniel Roos, The Machine that Changed the World (New York: Rawson 
and Associates, 1990); Richard Florida and Martin Kenney, "Transplanted Organizations: The 
Transfer of Japanese Industrial Organization to the U.S.," American Sociological Review, 56 
(June 1991), 381-398; and Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production: 
The Japanese System and its Transfer to the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). 
6. Neo-Fordism views lean production as a theoretical alternative which in practice 
produces an intensified or hyper-Fordist regime of production and accumulation. 
54 LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL/WINTER 1994 
highlights the deeper continuities between mass production and lean produc-
tion.7 Still others have pointed to more synthetic models of production and 
consumption that incorporate the best Fordist and "post-Fordist" elements in 
a new regime that acknowledges the shortcomings of Fordist mass produc-
tion, but preserves a critical role for organized labor.8 
Against the background of this scholarly debate and the crisis of 
Fordism, the first and second sections of this article will examine the restruc-
turing of the North American auto industry and UAW's and CAW's quite 
different and distinctive responses to these developments. The third section 
will explore the UAW-General Motor's collective response to the transplant 
phenomenon: their agreement to locate the Saturn auto plant in Tennessee, 
recruit UA W -represented workers, and jointly operate a lean production 
facility. Then this section will turn to the UA W local's response to the 
challenges that jointness has posed in the union's representation of its 
members. The fourth section will examine the active involvement of the 
CAW in the recruitment of CAMI (the General Motors-Suzuki joint ven-
ture), the collective agreement it struck with Suzuki to represent the workers, 
and the dilemmas the union leadership has faced in organizing and repre-
senting workers. The next section will focus on the common challenges both 
unions have yet to overcome in organizing the other East Asian automobile 
facilities: Honda, Hyundai, Nissan, Subaru-Isuzu, and Toyota. Finally, the 
7. Knuth Dohse, Ulrich Jurgens, and Thomas Maish, "From 'Fordism' to 'Toyotism'? 
The Social Organization of the Labor Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry," Politics 
and Society, 14 (1985), 115-146; Stephen Meyer, "The Persistence of Fordism: Workers and 
Technology in the American Automobile Industry 190{}-1960," On the Line: Essays in the 
History of Auto Work, , ed. by Nelson Lichenstein and Stephen Meyer (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1989), 73-95; Jane Jenson, '"Different' but not 'Exceptional': Canada's Perme-
able Fordism,'' Canadian Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 26 (1989), 69-94; and John 
Bellamy Foster and Charles Woolfson, "Corporate Restructuring and Business Unionism: The 
Lessons of Caterpillar and Ford,'' New Left Review, 147 (March/April 1989), 51--66. 
8. Wolfgang Streeck, "Introduction: Industrial Relations, Technological Change and 
Economic Restructuring,'' Wolfgang Streeck, ed. Industrial Relations and Technological Change 
in the British, Italian and German Automobile Industry (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum, 1985); 
Rianne Mahon, "From Fordism to?: New Technology, Labour Markets and Unions," Economic 
and Industrial Democracy, 8 (1987), 5--60; Lowell Turner, Democracy at Work: Changing 
World Labor Markets and the Future of Labor Unions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); 
Barry Bluestone and Irving Bluestone, Negotiating the Future: A Labor Perspective on American 
Business (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Alain Lipietz. Towards a New Economic Order: 
Postfordism, Ecology, and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Richard 
Edwards, Rights at Work: Employment Relations in the Post-Union Era (Washington, DC: 
Brookings, 1993); Jane Jenson and Rianne Mahon, eds., Challenge of Restructuring: North 
American Labor Movements Respond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); and 
Charlotte A.B. Yates, From Plant to Politics: The Autoworkers Union in Postwar Canada 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993). 
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article will close by comparing the UA W and CAW transplant experiences, 
particularly Saturn and CAMI, and by exploring the risks and opportunities 
the unions face from the recently signed North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFT A). 
The Restructuring of the U.S. and Canadian Automobile Industries 
Until the mid-1960s, the American and Canadian auto industries were 
structured into two separate operations by tariff protection legislation, As a 
consequence, auto and auto parts production and sales, though dominated by 
the Big Three Detroit automakers were largely organized along national 
lines with only limited cross border trade in assembled autos. Eventually, 
Canada's smaller market for cars and trucks limited its productivity and 
caused the Canadian auto industry's competitive position to deteriorate vis-
a-vis the United States. As John Holmes argues, the policy "solution to this 
crisis lay in rationalization of assembly and parts production in Canada and 
its integration with production in the United States."9 The 1965 Auto Pact 
(U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Trade Agreement) integrated Canadian 
auto and auto parts production into a continental market and dramatically 
increased "productivity in the Canadian assembly and parts industries by 
creating a larger market for automotive products within which the full 
benefits of specialization and large scale production could be achieved.'' 10 
The United States and Canadian auto industries and their workers are 
now beset by a shared crisis-a crisis of Fordism, one affecting the entire 
system of Fordist production and its underlying regime of capital accumu-
lation.11 The principal causes of this crisis are the internationalization of 
auto production and introduction of new process technologies by Japan and 
newly industrializing countries like South Korea. The Fordist model has 
9. John Holmes, "Industrial Restructuring in a Period of Crisis: An Analysis of the 
Canadian Automobile Industry, 1973-1983," Antipode, 20 (1988), 35. 
10. Ibid. 
11. The crisis of Fordism is rooted in Fordist mass production techniques and its ac-
companying mass consumption forms, which include economies of scale based on a Taylorist 
division of mass assembly line production into ever more specific and defined tasks; a stan-
dardized production system with a division of labor ·'which was inflexible, hierarchical, and 
characterized by increasing automation, routinization, and mechanization or production tasks" 
(John Holmes, "Industrial Restructuring in a Period of Crisis: An Analysis of the Canadian 
Automobile Industry, 1973-1983," Antipode, 20 (1988), 39); and a labor-management system 
typified by hundreds of job categories, seniority rights, and contracts with wage rate increases 
automatically tied to productivity increases and by an absolute bifurcation of labor issues (e.g., 
hourly wages and job duties) and managerial prerogatives (e.g., quality standards, product 
design, and line speed). 
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been challenged by lean production or Japanese Production Management 
(JPM), a flexible production system characterized by integrated superior 
quality control, a "leaner" more stringent supply and assembly process, and 
a labor management relations system based on "work teams" that require the 
use of the team concept to provide multiskilled training, job rotation, and 
continuous worker performance. Now the major issue is whether lean 
production will overcome the Fordist model and replace it as the ruling 
mode of production and consumption. 
The painful process of industrial restructuring in the United States and 
Canada has underlined the unique benefits and common problems of their 
auto industries. The globalization of the auto industry and the sourcing of 
auto parts and subassemblies around the world has led U.S. auto assembly 
operations and parts suppliers increasingly to move to Mexico. Auto parts 
with a high energy content have been sourced to Canada. An historically 
favorable exchange rate and a national health insurance program have also 
given Canada a labor cost advantage of their U.S. counterparts, perhaps 
assuring Canada of holding its share of the more labor-intensive aspects of 
the auto industry. 12 
At the same time, Japanese lean production methods and other "post-
Fordist" techniques pose a formidable challenge to the continental auto 
industry and its workers. The existence of enormous overcapacity jeopar-
dizes the long-term survival of the Big Three automakers in the United 
States and their branch plants in Canada. Compounding this threat is the 
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1987. As the long-term power in 
bilateral trade, the United States looked with great relish at the prospects of 
lowering or eliminating trade barriers to Canada. The Mulroney government, 
for its part, touted the agreement as a method for overcoming Canada's 
branch plant economy and enabling it to become a player in the global 
marketplace. Since 1987, however, the agreement has become a major factor 
in undercutting the long-standing advantages of the Canadian auto industry. 
Ontario's loss of several hundred thousand manufacturing jobs and the mass 
exodus of auto parts suppliers to the United States have rocked the native 
auto industry and its unionized auto workers. 13 
The prospect of a U.S.-Canadian trade agreement, coupled with the 
Reagan administration's calls for formal trade restrictions and domestic 
content requirements on Japanese autos and the Canadian government's 
12. Ibid., 42, 43. 
13. Clyde Farmsworth, "Free-Trade Accord is Enticing Canadian Companies to U.S.," 
New York Times, August 9, 1991, A-1. 
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TABLE 1 
Saturn, Asian Automobile Transplants, and their Joint Ventures with 
Big Three Automobile Companies in the United States and Canada 
Startup 1992 Union 
Plant Location Date Production Employees Status 
AutoAiliance Flat Rock, MI 11/84 167,940 3,500 UAW 
(Ford-Mazda) Local 3000 
CAM! Ingersoll, ONT 11!89 143,526 2,000 CAW 
(GM-Suzuki) Local 88 
Diamond-Star Bloomington- 9/88 139,705 3,000 UAW 
(Mitsubishi) Normal, IL Local 2488 
Honda Marysville, & 11/82 458,254 9,700 Non-union 
E. Liberty, OH 
Alliston, ONT 10/86 104,270 800 Non-union 
Hyundai Bromont, QUE 1/89 13,548 1,200 Non-union 
Nissan Smyrna, TN 6/83 300,086 5,700 Non-union 
NUMMI Fremont, CA 11!84 255,729 3,000 UAW 
(GM-Toyota) Local 2244 
Saturn Spring Hill, TN 7/90 212,112 6,000 UAW 
(GM) Local 1854 
Subaru-Isuzu Lafayette, IN 9/89 123,877 1,900 Non-union 
Toyota Cambridge, ONT 12/88 68,092 1,000 Non-union 
Georgetown, KY 5/88 240,382 3,450 Non-union 
limitation of Japanese autos to eighteen percent of their vehicle market, 
undercut prior economic reluctance of Japanese and South Korean auto 
corporations to locate assembly plants in the United States and Canada. 
Between 1984 and 1986, Nissan, Honda, Toyota, Suzuki, Mitsubishi, 
Mazda, Subaru and Isuzu, and Hyundai in rapid succession announced cor-
porate decisions to build auto transplants or joint ventures in the American 
Midwest, Ontario, and Quebec. 
The UAW, CAW, and Industrial Restructuring 
American labor unions are relatively weak and play an increasingly 
marginal role on the United States political scene and economy. By compari-
son, Canadian organized labor enjoys relative strength and greater political 
resources in Canadian politics and political economy. Canadian scholars 
have explained Canadian labor's political and economic advantage in terms 
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of the more favorable federal and provincial laws supporting union certifi-
cation, the more militant strategies of organizing and politicking by leading 
sectors of the labor movement, the success of Quebec's "Quiet Revolution" 
in spurring unionization in the public sector, the existence of a social 
democratic party allied to Canadian labor, and perhaps the conservative 
statist cultural heritage of the Canadian state. 14 Other students of the Ca-
nadian movement have pointed to the growing provincial and federal clout 
of Canadian labor's political vehicle, the New Democratic party, and the 
militant response by many elements of the labor movement which have 
helped to stem the New Right tide in Canadian politics and recoup labor's 
position and status on the Canadian political landscape. 15 
Within the North American auto sector, the more traditional labor-
management model continues to be practiced within Canadian plants while 
much of American organized labor has moved from the more adversarial 
model towards a more "cooperative" labor-management approach. 16 These 
different models have played themselves out in the different paths taken by 
the United Auto Workers and the Canadian Auto Workers in the era of 
capitalist industrial restructuring from the Arab oil embargo onward. With 
the risk of double-digit unemployment and inflation, the inroads of Japanese 
and then South Korean auto firms into the North American and global auto 
marketplace, the accompanying challenge of "post-Fordist" management 
and labor relations to Fordist organization, and the ascendancy of a New 
Right agenda in the United States and, somewhat less so, in Canada, orga-
nized labor in the North American auto industry has faced a series of 
overlapping and mutually supporting challenges to its traditional role and 
place. 
14. Christopher Huxley, David Kettler, and James Struthers, "Is Canada's Experience 
'Especially Instructive'?" Unions in Transition: Entering the Second Century, ed. by Seymour 
Martin Lipset (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1986) 113-132; John 
Calvert, "The Divergent Paths of Canadian and American Labor," Reshaping the US Left: 
Popular Struggles in the 1980s, ed. by Mike Davis and Michael Sprinker (New York: Verso, 
1988), 213-228; and Roy J. Adams, "North American Industrial Relations: Divergent Trends 
in Canada and the United States,'' International Labor Review, 128 (January-February 1989), 
47-54. 
15. Leo Pan itch and Donald Swartz. The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Consent 
to Coercion Revisited (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988); Daniel Drache and Harry Glasbeek, 
"The New Ford ism in Canada: Capital's Offensive, Labour's Opportunity,'' Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal, 27 (Fall 1989), 517-560; and Robert Storey, "Studying Work in Canada,'' Canadian 
Journal of Sociology, 16 (1991), 241-264. 
16. Stephen Wood, "The Cooperative Labour Strategy in the US Auto Industry, Economic 
and Industrial Democracy, 7 (1986), 415-447. 
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As Sam Gindin 17 and Charlotte Yates18 have argued, the greater suc-
cess of the Canadian wing of the international auto union in responding to 
political and corporate incursions on its power and influence hinged, in part 
"on [the] union's past choices and practices, its analysis of society and 
organized labor's place within it, and those organizational structures which 
facilitate or impede a union's ability to effectively mobilize its member-
ship."19 The UAW leadership responded to corporate demands for conces-
sions and union-busting campaigns in ways that meant de facto acceptance 
of a strategic reformulation of the collective bargaining process and the 
union's power and place within it. 20 The Canadian UAW, on the other hand, 
fought these threatening developments in order to preserve the traditional 
framework of collective bargaining and maintain the vitality of the trade 
union movement. 21 
By adopting a no-concessions strategy; institutionalizing a "culture of 
struggle" through films, music, art, and other political educational materials; 
fostering internal democracy within the union wing; and establishing a well-
staffed research department to investigate the union's condition and to chart 
of new directions and policy alternatives, the Canadian wing has vaulted into 
the vanguard position in the Canadian labor movement and found itself on 
a collision course with its American parent. 
By 1985, the divisions within the leadership ranks of the international 
auto union became unbridgeable, forcing the Canadian wing to break away 
and set an independent course.22 Thereafter, the UAW confronted deep 
challenges to its already declining fortunes from the six Japanese transplants 
in the mid-American heartland while in Canada; likewise the entrance of 
East Asian auto facilities provided the most formidable challenge to the 
Canadian Auto Workers since its split with the international. One challenge 
to union power came from the transplants that had a Big Three joint venturer 
17. Sam Gindin, "Breaking Away: The Formation of the Canadian Auto Workers,'' 
Studies in Political Economy, 29 (Summer 1989), 63-89. 
18. Charlotte Yates, From Plant to Politics: The Canadian UAW, I936-I984, Ph.D. 
Dissertation (Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton University, 1988); and Charlotte Yates, "The Internal 
Dynamics of Union Power: Explaining Canadian Autoworkers' Militancy in the 1980s,'' Studies 
in Political Economy, 31 (Spring 1990), 73-105. 
19. Gindin. op.cit.,75. 
20. Wood, op.cit. 
21. Gindin, op.cit. 79-83; and Yates (1990), op.cit., 96-100. 
22. Jacqueline Scherer, "The Canadian-American UA W Controversy: Issues and Les-
sons,'' a paper prepared for the Midwest Association of Canadian Studies, 1988; Gindin, 
op.cit.; and John Holmes and A. Rusonik, The Breakup of an International Union: Uneven 
Development in the North American Auto Industry and the Schism in the UA W [Working paper 
90-1) (Kingston, Ont.: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1990). 
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(Mazda, NUMMI, and CAMI) and from Saturn with whom the UA W and 
CAW had negotiated prehire agreements.23 The third and fourth sections 
will explore the diverging paths taken by the UA W at Saturn and the CAW 
at CAMI. Another challenge, the focus of the fourth section, came from the 
six nonunion Japanese and Korean automobile companies whose transplants 
located in greenfield sites spanning the industrial corridor from Smyrna, 
Tennessee to Bromont, Quebec.24 
The United Auto Workers and Saturn 
The Saturn Project began in the early eighties at the initiative of Roger 
Smith, General Motors' chairman, as an experiment to compete head-to-
head with the Japanese automakers in the subcompact car market, a market 
GM had hitherto ceded its domestic and foreign competitors.25 Backed by 
the commitment and clout of GM's chairman, Saturn26 was designed by the 
Committee of 99 drawn from management and organized labor to leapfrog 
the competition and build subcompact cars in a revolutionary way using a 
23. The six Japanese and Korean automobile assembly plants are located near small 
towns in rural or greenfield settings; Diamond-Star (Mitsubishi) in Bloomington-Normal, Il-
linois; Honda in Marysville, Anna, and East Liberty, Ohio and Alliston, Ontario; Hyundai in 
Bromont, Quebec; Nissan in Smyrna, Tennessee; Subaru-lsuzu in Lafayette, Indiana; and 
Toyota in Georgetown, Kentucky, and Cambridge, Ontario. 
Diamond-Star, initially a 50/50 Chrysler-Mitsubishi joint venture, became a wholly owned 
Japanese transplant in October 1991 when Mitsubishi purchased Chrysler's 50 percent stake. 
Clay Chandler and Bradley A. Stertz, "Mitsubishi Buys Chrysler's 50% Stake in their Diamond-
Star Joint Venture,'' Wall Street Journal (October 30, 1991), A-4. 
Saturn is located in Spring Hill, Tennessee, a greenfield site, as is one of the three Big-
Three-Japanese joint ventures, CAM! (GM-Suzuki) in Ingersoll, Ontario, but the other two, 
NUMMI (GM-Toyota) and Auto-Alliance (Ford-Mazda) are in the brownfield sites of Fremont, 
California and Flat Rock, Michigan. 
24. Mazda was initially described as a Japanese transplant, not as a joint venture. 
Nevertheless, it appears to have been a Ford-Mazda joint venture from the start. Ford owned 
25 percent of Mazda, Mazda purchased its Flat Rock plant from Ford, which makes Ford 
Probes, and unlike any other transplant, Mazda negotiated a prehire agreement with the UA W. 
Mike Parker, "New Union Concessions in Secret Agreement Between UAW and Mazda,'' 84 
Labor Notes (February 1986), 1; and Joseph J. Fucini and Suzy Fucini, Working for the 
Japanese: Inside Mazda's American Auto Plant (New York: Free Press, 1990), 8-9. In June 
1992, Flat Rock assembly plant became a 50!50 Ford/Mazda joint venture, which is named 
Autoalliance International. 
25. Maryann Keller, Rude Awakening: The Rise, Fall, and Struggle for Recovery of 
General Motors (New York: Harper-Collins, 1989), 93-96. 
26. Saturn was named and modeled after America's rocket used in the Apollo mission 
to overcome the Soviet Union's early lead in space exploration and to send Americans to the 
moon. 
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whole new production system and a unique labor-management contract.27 
Although Roger Smith's dream of a highly automated "paperless" 
factory of the future ran aground of technological and organizational reali-
ties, many others were realized when GM formally announced its decision 
in early January 1985 to form the Saturn Corporation, as a wholly owned 
GM subsidiary, and to solicit bids from sites and localities for the Saturn 
production facility. 28 In the industrial recruitment contest that followed, 38 
states offered a variety of incentive packages to attract the GM investment. 
In July 1985, GM ended this six-month contest with an announcement that 
it had accepted Tennessee's $80 million offer and would build the Saturn at 
Spring Hill, a greenfield site about 30 miles south of Nashville.29 
General Motors agreed from the outset to negotiate a union contract 
with the United Auto Workers union despite Saturn's location in a right-to-
work state. To the consternation of state and particularly local Tennessee 
officials who saw the state's incentives as a means of relieving area unem-
ployment, the GM-UAW agreement included a provision stating that the 
Saturn workforce would be recruited entirely from UA W members on in-
definite layoff or from UAW volunteers at GM's other U.S. plants.30 
The GM-UAW Saturn contract was a radical departure from the tra-
ditional union-management agreements and met with heated debate and stiff 
opposition despite the fact that the UAW executive board ratified it by a 23-
to-1 vote on July 26, 1985, and included an attachment to the contract 
characterizing the Saturn accord as a "special case" and not as a precedent 
for other plants.31 Yet few could doubt that it established an alternative 
27. Ellen Jordan, "Saturn Unfolds: The Dream Becomes a Reality,'' Nashville-At-Home, 
October 1988, 13-14; and Lee Alpert, Call Me Roger (New York; Contemporary Books, 1988), 
239-48. 
28. H. Brint Milward and Heidi Hosbach Newman, "State Inventive Packages and the 
Industrial Location Decisions," in Ernest J. Yanarella and William C. Green, eds., The Politics 
of Industrial Recruitment: Japanese Automobile Investment and Economic Development in the 
American States (Westport, Cf: Greenwood Press, 1990), 41-43; and William F. Fox and 
Warren G. Nee!, "Saturn: The Tennessee Lessons," Forum for Applied Research and Public 
Policy, Spring 1987; 7-16. On the shattering of the myth surrounding Saturn, see Keller, 
op.cit., 219-220. 
29. For the announcement, see Randy Hilman and James Pratt, "Spring Hill Gets Sat-
urn," The Tennessean, July 26, 1985, 1,8. Tennessee's $80 million incentive package included 
$50 million in road improvements and $30 million for worker training. For the terms of the 
incentive package, see the table in Milward and Newman, op.cit., 35. 
30. Ann J. Job. "Contract OK Won't Mean End to UAW Debate," Detroit Free Press, 
July 28, 1985, 13A; and Tim Kiska, "Tennessee May Not Get Jobs Boom," Detroit Free Press, 
July 28, 1985, 12A; and "Tennessee Threatens to Block SATURN Plant," Detroit Free Press, 
September 1, 1985, 7A. 
31. John Russo, "Saturn Rings: What GM's Saturn Project is Really About." Labor 
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model for union management relations in the auto industry. 
A key Saturn contract provision contained a commitment to jointness 
or worker-management cooperation at every level of the plant's operation. 
The Saturn contract has been exceptional in its elimination of Paragraph 8's 
management rights clause, a cornerstone of GM-UAW contracts since the 
thirties, and its substitution by vaguely worded Sections 10 and ll's provi-
sions on structure, decision making, and consensus, which call for "full 
participation by the Union" and "use of a consensus decision-making pro-
cess" involving "free flow of information and clear definition of the deci-
sion-making process."32 This extension of formal worker participation in 
management, planning, and operation involved the institution of jointly 
represented committees grounded in consensus decision making and prob-
lem solving from the shop floor to the strategic planning council. In addi-
tion, the contract reduced the number of job classifications from over one 
hundred to one for all unskilled workers and three to five for skilled 
workers.33 Other features of Japanese production management were also 
incorporated into the contract or structured into plant operations and worker-
management relations. These included use of the team concept, extensive 
training for all workers, protection against layoffs except for catastrophic 
events or severe economic conditions, and reduction or elimination of status 
differences between labor and management. The last noteworthy provision 
established a pay formula that would eventually put up to 20 percent of 
union workers annual pay "at risk" on the basis of meeting performance, 
quality, training, and profits objectives or expectations.34 
Saturn stands out as a "pure post-Fordist" model for a unionized auto 
plant and as a challenge to an international auto union to fashion a strategy 
for turning the rhetoric of workplace democracy into reality. Yet the UAW's 
involvement in the Saturn project exists against the backdrop of a union that 
has suffered a veritable hemorrhage in membership35 and has straddled the 
Research Review, vol. V (Fall 1986), 67-77; Ann M. Job, "Pete Kelly: A Critic Within the 
Family,'' Detroit Free Press, July 11, 1985, lOB; Ann M. Job, "SATURN May Change Labor 
Relations,'' Detroit Free Press, July 11, 1985, IF; and Helen Fogel, "For Union It May Be a 
Mixed Blessing 'Doing Things Differently' Could Mean Fewer Auto Plant Jobs," Detroit Free 
Press, July 28, 1985, 14A. 
32. "Saturn Labor Agreement Approved by UAW in July 1985 [Text]." Washington, 
DC: Bureau of National Affairs, June 4, 1986, E-1 to E-6. 
33. Ann M. Job, "UAW Pact Blurs Worker, Manager Distinctions,'' Detroit Free Press, 
July 28, 1985, 14A. 
34. Ibid. 
35. UAW membership plummeted from 1.53 million in 1973 to 862,000 in 1991. The 
UA W dropped from representing 86 percent of the American auto workers in 1979 to less than 
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issue of worker participation versus worker power and sent mixed cues to 
union locals about "post-Fordist" or lean production-type practices. These 
circumstances have triggered a diverse set of responses from plant to plant 
ranging from outright resistance to virtual total accommodation.36 Since the 
plant's startup in July 1990, the Saturn experiment in labor-management 
cooperation or jointness has set in motion some ominous trends that threaten 
to undercut the strength and solidarity within the UA W and erode its 
commitment to local union democracy. 
The Saturn contract's elimination of the management rights clause and 
its commitment to jointness have meant that in the everyday operation of the 
Saturn complex, the terms and locus of corporate power have shifted from 
the conventional hierarchical arrangements epitomized in the managerial 
rights provision at the strategic level to the more formally participative and 
pseudo-egalitarian relations underpinned by a veiled use of corporate power 
worked out within joint committees and in training sessions. 
To illustrate, Saturn's operations involve a multiplicity of joint com-
mittees from top to bottom that involve representatives of rank-and-file 
union workers and management in consensus decision making on long-term 
strategic and more immediate day-to-day issues. Some proponents of the 
Saturn experiment, like Irving and Barry Bluestone, applaud it as an ap-
proximation of an innovative Enterprise Compact of the future, 37 but the 
daily jointness of the Saturn worker cooperation process has more funda-
mentally served to socialize union representatives and the workforce into the 
Saturn corporate ideology, values, and priorities set forth in the mission 
statement. Visitors to Saturn provide evidence of the blurring of labor and 
management's sepa~ate identities and conflicting interests with their oft-
cited observation that it is impossible to distinguish the formal presentations 
of salaried (management) employees from those of the nonsalaried (labor) 
employees at the plant or the training center.38 Saturn is also vulnerable to 
Robbins's and March's critique of Theory Z organizations analyzed and 
touted by William Ouchi, since the Spring Hill assembly plant tends to 
obscure in its daily operation the critical difference between worker power 
68 percent in 1991. Cited in Jane Slaughter, "Shrinking Auto Union Beats Back Reformers,'' 
Autoworker Gazette: Newsletter of the Rank and File Coalition, July/July 1992, 3. 
36. Turner, op.cit., see intro., chap. 1, and conclusion. 
37. Barry Bluestone and Irving Bluestone, Negotiating the Future, A Labor Perspective 
on American Business (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1992), 191-201. 
38. Most recently mentioned by Gary High, Manager, Human Resource Development, 
People Systems, Saturn Corporation, interview, Training Center, Saturn plant, Spring Hill, 
Tennessee, March 16, 1993. 
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and worker participation and to enhance managerial control "while giving 
the impression of lessening it."39 
Worker training assumes a critical role when formal managerial rights 
are scrapped for the appearance of greater democracy and equal labor-
management influence. On the positive side, the Saturn training program is 
one of the most extensive and innovative among American and Japanese 
auto assembly plants in the United States.40 Production workers are expected 
to make a commitment to receive at least 92 hours of formal training annu-
ally as part of the risk and reward compensation system of the company. 
Down from 300 and then 175 hours during 1988-1991, the 92 hours, 
roughly 5 percent of total annual work hours, represents the "at risk" portion 
of workers' wages. 41 Yet, as critics of corporate training programs like 
Saturn's point out, upwards of 70 percent of such training programs at GM 
facilities fall in the category of cultural or attitudinal training, i.e., indoctri-
nation into the reigning corporate ideology. Much of the rest that falls into 
the category of technical training is not transferable to other plants and, 
therefore, reduces the worker's potential mobility.42 
The increasing solidification of the union-management partnership at 
the elite level has been accompanied by the ebbing of democratic processes 
within the local union. Personal interviews and published reports have 
disclosed that local 1854 has no union hall outside the plant; its meetings are 
freely attended by corporate and human resources officials;43 and its local 
president, Mike Bennett, has buffered himself from the rank and file by two 
39. The quotation is from Stephen P. Robbins, "The Theory Z Organization from a 
Power-Control Perspective,'' California Management Review, vol. XXV (January 1993), 75; 
and Robert M. Marsh, "The Difference Between Participation and Power in Japanese Facto-
ries,'' Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 45 (January 1992), 250-257. Ouchi's book 
is titled, Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge (New York: 
Avon Books, 1981). 
40. High, interview, March 16, 1993; and Geber, op.cit., 29. 
41. Cited from a GM memorandum in David Robertson and Jeff Wareham, Technological 
Change in the Auto Industry (North York, Canada: CAW Technology Project, 1987), 47; 
David Robertson, "Corporate Training Syndrome: What We Have is Not Enough and More 
Would Be Too Much," and "The Meaning of Multi-skilling,'' in Training for What? Labor 
Perspectives on Skill Training, ed. by Nancy Jackson (Toronto: Our Schools/Our Selves 
Foundation (November 1992), 18-28 and 29-42 respectively. 
42. In addition to our site visit, guided tour, and interview with Gary High at the Saturn 
Training Center, our analysis of corporate training at Saturn also draws upon selected materials 
provided by the human resources manager and two articles: Brian S. Moskal, "Hybrid Incubator 
Hatches Workers,'' Industry Week, August 7, 1989, 27-28; and Beverly Geber, "Saturn Grand 
Experiment,'' Training, vol. 29 (June 1992), 27-35. 
43. Don Hinkle, business writer, Columbia Daily Herald, interview, Columbia, Ten-
nessee, March 15, 1993; and High, interview, op.cit. 
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layers of 350-400 appointed union officials who hold positions as work unit 
module advisors and business unit coordinators.44 More alarming is the key 
role played by the local union leadership and its president in manufacturing 
consent and enforcing corporate policies cloaked as common interests of the 
rank-and-file membership. The stirrings of grass roots insurgency during the 
brief life of the union contract and the plant's operation were capped in 
March and April 1993 by a serious challenge and near run-off defeat of 
Bennett triggered by the deterioration of local union democracy and the 
progressive breakdown of local union leadership solidarity with other UA W 
local unions and the internal transformation of the local union into an agent 
of corporate power. 
During the March 1993 campaign, Bennett was criticized by his op-
ponents for his authoritarian, heavy-handed rule over the local, his disregard 
for national solidarity, and his apparently active pursuit of a strategy of local 
autonomy.45 Indicative of this tendency toward giving priority to local 
concerns was Bennett's criticism of UAW local 1714's nine-day strike in 
September 1992 against the GM Lordstown stamping plant over outsourcing 
policy. When the strike idled Saturn production for a week, Bennett unsuc-
cessfully appealed to UA W international officials to exempt some of the 
Lordstown workers from the strike in order to let them cross the picket lines 
to produce parts for Saturn.46 Bennett's appeal clearly demonstrated his 
greater interest in maintaining Saturn production over saving jobs of fellow 
and sister members at the Lordstown plant. 
The Saturn experiment thus raises a number of questions about the 
prospects and implications of the UAW's unique partnership with the Saturn 
corporation for the UAW's status, strategy, and future strength. Saturn also 
presents a host of issues for labor and management. For local 1854, Saturn 
raises the issue of the local's unfolding identity. Is it becoming a truly equal 
partner in a model Enterprise Compact or is it slipping into the mold of a 
company union by another name? As for the Saturn operation itself, the 
Saturn experiment asks whether this apparent corporate success story offers 
generalizable lessons for other assembly plants in GM or whether its 
achievements to date are unique, idiosyncratic, and subject to changing 
whims of quixotic customers and shifting fortunes of a glutted North Ameri-
44. Don Hinkle, "Saturn Election May Impact Economic Growth in County," Columbia 
Daily Herald, March 10, 1993, 1,3. 
45. Don Hinkle, "Challenger Blasts Saturn's Union Head [interview with Bob Hoskins, 
nominee of Members for a Democratic Union], Columbia Daily Herald, March 9, 1993, 1,3. 
46. Jane Slaughter, "Auto Union Wins Outsourcing Protection After Nine-Day Lordstown 
Strike,'' Labor Notes, October 1993, 5. 
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can auto marketplace. For the United Auto Workers, Saturn raises the issue 
of whether and how the union can recover its past power and glory and forge 
a new identity. 
The Canadian Auto Workers and CAMI 
On August 27, 1986, General Motors, Canada's largest automaker, and 
Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., one of Japan's smallest, announced their decision to 
locate a $500 million auto assembly plant in Ingersoll, Ontario, on August 
27, 1986. Christened CAMI47 by GM-Suzuki officers, the plant itself was 
expected to employ 2,000 workers and produce annually some 200,000 
automobiles and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) when up to full production, 
scheduled for 1991. 
Neither the size of the incentive package nor the mix of inducements 
comprising it stirred much commentary. What was most noteworthy about 
this announcement was that, in addition to the usual cast of characters (i.e., 
Ontario Premier David Peterson, DRIE Minister Michael Cote, Ontario Min-
istry of Industry Trade and Technology Pat Levelle, Suzuki President Osamu 
Suzuki and GM Chairman Roger Smith) Canadian Auto Workers' (CAW) 
President Bob White was in attendance and a signatory to the agreement.48 
His presence symbolized the decision of the president of Suzuki Motor Co. 
to avoid a battle over unionization of the plant and to accept from the outset 
the organization of its workers by Canada's militant auto workers union.49 
The GM-Suzuki/CA W agreement, which took over two years to nego-
tiate, materialized out of discussions initiated by President Suzuki with 
CAW leader Bob White in Japan in mid-1985, continued by means of infor-
mal bargaining among the Japanese automaker and Canadian partner and the 
union, and concluded with an understanding in the summer of 1986. A 
formal three-year contract between the two sides was reached in mid-Janu-
ary 1989 and was ratified by over 80 percent of CAW local 88's member-
ship on January 21, 1989.50 This flexible labor agreement was a clear de-
parture from traditional auto union contracts and represented a necessary 
47. CAMI is an acronym for Canadian-American Manufacturing, Inc. and the symbol for 
a divinity in Shintoism. 
48. James Daw, "GM, Suzuki to Build Car Plant in Ingersoll," Toronto Star, August 27, 
1986, El. 
49. James Daw, "Japanese-style Hiring Hall Knocks Auto Workers' Boots Off," Toronto 
Star, July 24, 1988, Fl. 
50. Interview with Ron Pellerin, Director of Service, Canadian Auto Workers, Willowdale, 
Ontario, August 1, 1991. 
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concession by the CAW to gain access to an auto plant organized around 
Japanese lean production methods.5 1 
The CAMI plant's management is divided between GM managers who 
handle human resource and financing functions and Suzuki management 
personnel who are responsible for plant design, car models, much of the 
machinery, and for running the manufacturing and engineering operations 
and sourcing activity.52 With its modified Japanese-style management, 
CAMI has become an experimental laboratory for training GM executives in 
the so-called lean production facilities in other parts of Canada and the 
United States.53 For the Canadian Auto Workers, it has also been an impor-
tant testing ground for blending traditional union interests and goals with a 
management philosophy and production line guided by new assumptions, 
tasks, techniques, controls, and social relations. 54 
In so doing, the CAMI plant and its "post-Fordist" methods have 
created a series of problems and dilemmas, which the auto union and its 
leadership have yet to overcome. 
This new flexible production facility has instituted new organizational 
and production methods, including the team concept, quality circles, 
multiskilling, and a truncated pseudo-egalitarian job classification structure, 
that are antithetical to traditional labor-management relations and the struc-
ture and roles of unions. The CAW response to these changes, at least on the 
surface, has appeared ambivalent and contradictory. The CAW has rhe-
torically upheld the virtues of traditional collective bargaining methods and 
adversarial trade unionism in the face of the "post-Fordist" threat from East 
Asia. For instance, in its "CAW Statement on the Reorganization of 
Work,"55 the leadership of the Canadian auto workers set forth a strong and 
sweeping eleven-point indictment of workplace restructuring along Japanese 
Production Management (JPM) lines and rejected virtually all of the major 
51. Interview with James Rinehart, professor of sociology, University of Western Ontario, 
London, Ontario, July 27, 1991; and David Robertson, James Rinehart, Christopher Huxley, 
and the CAW Research Group on CAMI, "Team Concept and Kaizen: Japanese Production 
Management in a Unionized Auto Plant," Studies in Political Economy, vol. 39 (Autumn 1992), 
77-107. 
52. Lindsay Chappell, "GM Flocks North to Learn from Lean, Mean CAMI," Automotive 
News, 66 (May 20, 1991b), 1,44; and interview with Tom Grygorcewicz, plant chair, CAW 
local 88, CAMI plant, Ingersoll, Ontario, July 30, 1991. 
53. Chappell, op.cit. 
54. Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit.; and Jeff Blount, "Behind the Lines," 
Canadian Business, January, 1990, 62-67. 
55. Canadian Auto Workers, "Statement on the Reorganization of Work," Willowdale, 
Ont.: CAW National Headquarters, 1989. 
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features of Japanese-inspired flexible production. At the same time, the 
CAW policy statement champions true workplace democracy and supports 
quality production and technological innovation that do not weaken worker 
rights, erode workplace conditions, and undercut union independence. On 
the other hand, the Canadian auto union made a "tactical compromise,"56 
and entered into negotiations with Suzuki, and then GM and Suzuki, that 
resulted in a union contract at the CAMI plant. In exchange for recognition 
as the sole bargaining agent for CAMI's production and maintenance em-
ployees, the union formally endorsed with only slight modification a flexible 
production agreement that included the team concept, the kaizen (or con-
tinuous improvement) process, a highly truncated job classification scheme, 
and quality circles.57 
Since signing the CAMI contract, the union has striven to confront the 
dilemmas of working in a plant governed by principles and practices in-
imical to traditional union authority and rights. Indeed, even before gaining 
union representation at CAMI, the education and research departments in the 
CAW national office began to work out the problems and dilemmas posed 
by JPM techniques.58 As CAMI's local88 and the CAW national headquar-
ters have come to grips with the day-to-day functioning of the CAMI plant, 
the value of the "tactical compromise" has become more apparent. The 
CAW is confronting a new and evolving set of production methods and 
industrial relations that, in helping to foment the crisis of Fordism, is se-
verely testing the capacity of unions to adapt to, and to struggle to modify 
and refashion so-called "post-Fordism" in the production process and on the 
shopfloor. 59 While there is no certainty that these efforts will succeed, a 
survey of CAMI local 88's newsletter and interviews with CAW local and 
national representatives60 confirm that the union is "locked in a struggle for 
the hearts and minds of the workforce" and is strategically positioned 
"between a collective agreement that accommodates aspects of team concept 
and a policy statement of the national union that raises substantial questions 
about the implications of JPM."61 Already, it has become clear that the role 
and loyalty of the team leaders are pivotal in shaping the outcome of the 
56. Rinehart, op.cit. 
57. CAMI-CAW, Agreement between CAM/ Automotive Inc., and CAW Local88, January 
23, 1989-September 14, 1992. 
58. Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit, 13. 
59. Don Wells, Empty Promises: Quality of Work Life Program and the Labor Move-
ment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); Drache and Glasbeek, op.cit.; and Robertson, 
Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit. 
60. Grygorcewicz, op.cit.; and Pellerin, op.cit. 
61. Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit., 14. 
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combat. 62 Whether the production teams become integrated into the corpo-
rate philosophy of the company or become vehicles for resistance and recon-
struction of the labor process depends crucially on the self-identity of those 
leaders. Are they appendages of management or representatives of union 
labor? 
The CAW at various levels has also undertaken several initiatives to 
illuminate and support the shopfloor struggle. In the negotiations over the 
CAMI contract, the CAW bargained for the right to monitor the plant's 
operation. This concession has led to a two-year study by the CAW research 
team of the dynamics and impact of flexible production methods upon this 
unionized plant.63 The CAW has also investigated in a series of studies some 
of the critical issues relating to the impact of technological innovation in 
industries where it has union representation.64 In addition, the CAW re-
search staff has also turned its attention to an assessment of the union's 
stakes in the international debate over worker-training programs and the 
incipient policy debate over the same issue among Canadian labor studies 
and critical political economists.65 
Local 88's leadership, aware that modified flexible production tech-
niques have been appropriated by the Big Three automakers and instituted 
in other North American auto plants, has begun to participate in an informal 
network of unions in Canada and the United States designed to exchange 
information and lessons from their shared struggle with flexible production 
plants. Since January 1991, representatives between CAMI's local 88 and 
renegade UAW local 3000 at Mazda's Flat Rock, Michigan, plant have 
visited one another and issued reports on the Mazda local's success in 
winning concessions from management in its latest contract. These contracts 
shaped the demands, the strike, and the final outcome of local 88's contract 
negotiations with GM-Suzuki in late September and early October 1992. 
Subsequently, these two locals have brought representatives of the UAW 
62. Ibid., 30; Grygorcewicz., op.cit.; and Rob Pelletier, "President's Message;· Off the 
Line, No. 7 (February 1991), 1. 
63. Robertson, Rinehart, and Huxley, op.cit.; and CAW Research Group on CAMI, 
Japanese Management in a Unionized Auto Plant: Final Report to Labor Canada (North York: 
CAW Research Department, March 1992), inc. "CAMI Comments.'' 
64. David Robertson and Jeff Wareham, Technological Change in the Auto Industry: 
CAW Technology Project, Willowdale, Ontario: CAW!fCA, April 1987. 
65. Leon Muszynski and David A. Wolfe, "New Technology and Training: Lessons from 
Abroad,'' Canadian Public Policy, 15 (September 1989), 245-264; Rianne Mahon, "Adjusting 
to Win? The New Tory Training Initiative,'' How Ottawa Spends 1990-91: Tracking the 
Second Agenda, ed. by Katherine A. Graham (Ottawa, Ont.: Carleton University Press, 1991), 
73-111; David Robertson, "Corporate Training Syndrome,'' op.cit.; and David Robertson, 
"The Meaning of Multi-skilling," op.cit. 
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local at the Mitsubishi Diamond-Star plant in Bloomington-Normal, Illinois, 
into the evolving constellation.66 
The UAW, CAW and The Nonunion East Asian Transplants 
The UA W and CAW have faced formidable barriers in organizing the 
U.S. and Canadian East Asian transplants, which made location and re-
cruitment decisions and used lean production practices, in part, to limit labor 
organizing. All the transplants, located in greenfield sites, recruited from an 
essentially small town, nonunion labor force with limited manufacturing 
experience; employed a recruitment process to screen out applicants with 
prounion sympathies and screen in team players; and used the team concept 
not merely to organize and set the pace for work, but also to shape the 
workers shopfloor culture and, thereby, to frustrate worker efforts to orga-
nize.67 
The UA W efforts to organize the transplants suffered an early setback. 
In 1985, the union discontinued its Honda organizing drive for lack of 
worker support. The scheduled election was not held and for now, the UAW 
appears to have written off any active interest in returning to Marysville.68 
Of the other three nonunion transplants, the UAW's most serious or-
ganizing effort began at Nissan in early 1988. In the often bitter twenty-
month campaign that followed, the union focused on the high incidence of 
worker injuries, such as carpal tunnel syndrome, and company efforts to 
increase workloads through front-office kaizen.69 The UAW organizing 
campaign was, however, disadvantaged from the outset by Nissan's 
greenfield location in a right-to-work state, its recruitment and training 
practices, its high wages, and its no layoff practices. The UA W also encoun-
tered a vigorous antiunion campaign by the automaker.7° As Jane Slaughter 
observed: "Nissan used its plant-wide video system and daily work group 
66. David C. Binns, ed. and comp., A Shared Struggle: A Local 88 Communications 
Committee Special Report on the Meetings with UA W Local 3000 Mazda Unit in Flat Rock, 
Michigan. mimeo, 1991; John L. Fulton Special Report: A Communications Committee Fol-
low-up Report on UA W-Mazda Agreement 1991-1994, mimeo, 1991; and Grygorcewicz, op.cit. 
67. See., e.g. Shimada and McDuffie (1987), op.cit., 55-56; Kenney and Florida (1993), 
op.cit., 101-105; and Laurie Graham, "Inside a Japanese Transplant: A Critical Perspective," 
Work and Occupations, vol. 20 (May 1993), 147-73. 
68. "Workers at Nissan Turn Down U.S. Union." Toronto Star, July 28, 1989, A-4. 
69. Phil West, "Will Nissan Unionize?" Lexington Herald-Leader, July 23, 1989, D-1; 
and Jane Slaughter, "Behind the UAW's Defeat at Nissan," Labor Notes, September 1989, 
1,12,13. 
70. Kenney and Florida (1993), op.cit., 284-85; and Slaughter, op.cit., 13. 
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meetings to hammer home its antiunion message .... The day before the 
vote, Nissan shut down the line for up to an hour on each shift for captive 
audience meetings."71 
In July 1989, Nissan workers rejected UA W representation by a vote 
of 1622 (69 percent) to 711 (31 percent). Nearly one-third of Nissan workers 
had supported the union in spite of the transplant's efforts to recruit a non-
union workforce and to staunchly resist its unionization, but it was still a 
defeat that would encourage the other transplants to actively resist unioniza-
tion. In the wake of its defeat, the UAW bravely vowed to organize Toyota, 
but the Georgetown plant remains unorganized. At Subaru-Isuzu (SIA), the 
UAW began organizing efforts in 1991, but an election has yet to be held.72 
In Canada, the Toyota and Honda assembly plants have thus far been 
resistant to CAW organizing campaigns. Honda and Toyota have also lo-
cated in the greenfield sites of Alliston and Cambridge, Ontario, and have 
closely screened potential employees for union sympathies.73 The Honda 
management has also been accused of finding excuses for firing union sup-
porters in its workforce.74 The CAW has found it difficult to organize the 
two transplants, because Canadian plants have tighter security surrounding 
the facilities and maintain a lower profile in their communities than do those 
in the United States. Canadians also seem to be less hostile and willing to 
grant greater latitude to big business in Canada, despite the relative strength 
of trade unions and social democratic organization there.75 So it is not 
surprising that organizers have been hassled by plant security officers and 
forced to locate their leafleting completely off plant grounds.76 
The CAW chances of winning union certification appears highest at 
the Hyundai plant in Bromont. Having worked hard since the seventies to 
promote union organizing of plants in Quebec, the union restructured its 
organization, following its independence from the UA W, by setting up a 
71. Jane Slaughter, "Behind the UAW's Defeat at Nissan,'' Labor Notes, September 1989, 
1,12,13. 
72. Greg Gardner and Nunzio Lupo, "UAW, Stung by Loss in Tennessee, is Struggling," 
Lexington Herald-Leader, July 30, 1989, D-1; and Lindsay Chappell and Kathy Jackson, 
"UAW Again Targets the Transplants," Automotive News, January 14, 1991, 2. 
73. James Daw, "Japanese-style Hiring Hall Knocks Auto Workers' Boots Off," Toronto 
Star, July 24, 1988, Fl. 
74. Interview with Hemi Metic, Director of Organizing, Canadian Auto Workers, 
Willowdale, Ontario, August 1, 1991. 
75. Seymour Martin Lipset, North American Cultures: Values and Institutions in Canada 
and the United States [Borderlands Monograph Series #3] (Orono, Me.: The Canadian-
American Center, 1990). 
76. Metic, op.cit. 
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Quebec regional office and director and establishing a Quebec Council with 
co-equal status with the Ontario-dominated CAW Council.77 At Hyundai, 
the CAW organizing drive has centered on job rotation work rules and the 
sliding-scale pension plan introduced by Hyundai management.78 Since 
spring of 1991, reports have circulated that the auto union effort was close 
to reaching the magic number required for union certification, although one 
field organizer reported in early August 1991 that its formal request was 
being deferred.79 Apparently, the Hyundai management's release of con-
flicting information on the exact number of plant employees led union or-
ganizers to acquire extra signatures on union cards to be assured of acquiring 
certification,80 an effort complicated by a rumor that Hyundai was consid-
ering moving the plant to Mexico. 81 
In sum, the seven East Asian assembly plants in the American Mid-
west, Ontario, and Quebec have successfully resisted union organization 
efforts. None of their workers is represented by the UAW or CAW. Given 
the United States and Canada's prevailing economic woes and the high wage 
scales of these plants, the UAW's and CAW's struggle to unionize these 
transplants will face an uphill battle. At the same time, union organizers 
believe that the rising rates of job injuries and incidence of carpal tunnel 
syndrome and other repetitive stress ailments stemming from assembly line 
speedup and the kaizen process will lead to mounting worker restiveness, 
particularly with the aging of the presently young workforce. 
The UA W and CAW confront other dilemmas emanating from these 
East Asian plants. The widespread popularity of these vehicles (with the 
possible exception of Hyundai autos), combined with their production levels, 
have contributed greatly to the overcapacity problem in the North American 
marketplace. This has meant that older, typically unionized, auto plants in 
the United States and Canada have been most vulnerable to temporary 
layoffs and plant shutdowns. While UAW president Owen Bieber's position 
has been highly ambivalent, Bob White, the CAW president, has argued that 
77. Canadian Auto Workers, "CAW-Canada Organizing Report," Willowdale, Ont.: CAW 
National Headquarters, n.d. 
78. Lindsay Chappell, "CAW Tackles Hyundai Canada; Work Rules and Pensions Cited," 
Automotive News, 66 (February 11, 1991), 6. 
79. Metic, op.cit.; interview with Francois Shalom, "Battle to Form Union at Hyundai 
Heats Up; CAW Say It is Close to Having Enough Support to Hold Vote," Montreal Gazette, 
December 12, 1990, C1; and James Daw, "Hyundai Workers Sign Up for Union," Toronto Star, 
May 23, 1991, B4. 
80. Metic, op.cit. 
81. Interview with Damaris Rose, associate professor and research associate, Institute for 
National Scientific Research, Montreal, Ontario, August 5, 1991. 
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the overcapacity problem is management's problem, not an issue subject to 
collective bargaining with the union.82 Still, with the percentage of union-
ized plant closings in Canada doubling from 1989 to 199083 and with GM's 
announcement in December 1991 to abolish 74,000 jobs and close 21 plants 
by 1995,84 harder thinking and more ingenuity in promoting job security 
seem to be required. 
Conclusion 
The crisis of Fordism posed by the Japanese production methods re-
mains unresolved. Contrary to those scholars who have declared that 
Fordism has been superseded by "post-Fordism,"85 Rianne Mahon has ar-
gued that the possibilities for a diversified Fordist alternative for Canada 
spearheaded by organized labor, are outlined in the work of Streeck and 
anticipated by developments within the German labor movement.86 This 
strategic option emphasizes the critical role of organized labor, in coalition 
with other subordinate groups and movements, to remold tendencies toward 
authoritarian forms of "post-Fordism" in a direction that realizes the demo-
cratic promise of worker involvement, teamwork, multiskilled training, and 
other illusory claims of flexible production on the shopfloor.87 
The diverging paths taken by the UA W at Saturn and the CAW at 
CAMI demonstrate the growing gap between the strategies and tactics of 
these two auto unions in confronting the crisis of Fordism. Although neither 
union represents the central tendencies in the labor movement of each coun-
82. Bob White, "Presentation," The Canadian Auto Industry [The Financial Post Con-
ferences] (Harbour Castle Westin Hotel, Toronto, Ontario, February 12, 1991), 54-63; and 
Bob White, "An Inquiry Into the Current Situation of the Canadian Auto Industry,'' presen-
tation to the hearings before the Standing Committee on Industry, Science, Technology, Re-
gional & Western Development, Ottawa, Ontario, July 9, 1991. 
83. Jacqueline Scherer, "The Canadian Auto Workers: A Study in Canadian-United States 
Relations,'' a paper for the Midwest Association of Canadian Studies Conference, Lexington, 
Kentucky, October 11-13, 1990. 
84. Warren Brown, "GM to Abolish 74,000 jobs, Shut 21 Plants,'' Lexington Herald-
Leader, December 19, 1991, A-1. 
85. Kenney and Florida, op.cit.; and Womack, Jones, and Roos, op.cit. 
86. Mahon (1987, 1991), op.cit. 
87. William K. Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent; Gramsci, Politi-
cal Economy, and Canada," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, vol. 27 (1990), 
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try in trying to come to grips with that crisis, 88 the failure of cooperative 
strategies undertaken by many elements of the American labor movement 
exemplified by the UA W experience at Saturn to revive the fortunes of 
organized labor in the United States should give union leaders and labor 
studies scholars pause. By contrast, the continuing political struggle of the 
CAW at CAMI and its recently concluded successful strike at the GM-
Suzuki plant point to the outlines of a more appropriate, but no less militant 
strategy for labor in an era between Fordism and "post-Fordism." The CAW 
example shows that Fordist adversarial practices are not dead or outmoded, 
though perhaps the issues and terms of the political struggle have been 
modified. 
No doubt, this evolving CAW strategy and any new UA W strategic 
vista will have to evaluate the new risks and new opportunities from the 
ongoing process of hemispheric and global restructuring in the automobile 
industry and the recently concluded negotiations between the United States, 
Canada, and Mexico on a North American Free Trade Agreement. Orga-
nized labor may also face another and even more formidable challenge and 
be further disadvantaged by the Mexican maquiladoras (border plants) and 
the increased capacity of mobile capital to further redistribute segments of 
auto production in a continental free trade zone. At the same time, NAFT A 
will also provide renewed impetus to UA W and CAW efforts to develop 
closer ties with Mexican workers and to reassert the priority for a truly 
continental labor response.89 
The renewed power of the Democratic party in the United States and 
the ascendancy of the New Democratic party in Ontario and Canadian poli-
tics raises the question of what productive role they may play in the larger 
policy debate over industrial strategy, free trade, and industrial restructuring 
in a more tightly integrated global political economy. Fordism's great ma-
terial benefits to workers and consumers were derived in large part from 
organized labor's participation in this regime of accumulation and con-
sumption. If these parties and their leaders are to be worthy of their man-
88. An important and, in some ways, sobering point made by Don Wells, "Recent Inno-
vations in Labour-Management Relations: The Risks and Prospects for Labour in Canada and 
the United States," in Jenson and Mahon, op.cit., 290. 
89. Matt Witt, "Mexico-US-Canada ITA: Free Workers, Not Free Trade," Canadian 
Dimension, April-May 1991, 28-31; Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron, ed., The 
Political Economy of North American Free Trade (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); and 
Maureen Appel Molot, ed., Driving Continentally: National Policies and the North American 
Auto Industry (Ottawa, Can.: Carleton University Press, 1993). 
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dates, they must begin to think through the political stakes and policy terrain 
for alternatives to a market-based industrial strategy, which merely promotes 
a bimodal economy of good careers and quality products for the well-to-do 
and of service and retail jobs for the unorganized and exploited poor.90 
9o. Mahon (1987, 1991), op.cit.; and Mike Davis, "The Political Economy of Late Imperial 
America," New Left Review, No. 123 (1984), 6-38. 
